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Chapter 15
The New Jersey Pension System
Tom Bryan
Retirement benefits are big business in the public sector: the Public Pen-
sion Coordinating Council found that the number of active participants in
the plans was over 11 million and employer contributions to the plans were
$31.2 billion for the 261 large public plans responding to its 1996 survey
(Zorn 1988). The NewJersey public employee pension system is one of the
largest of these funds, ranking ninth among the top 1,000 pension funds in
terms of assets (Pensions and Investments 1999). For the 1997 actuarial valua-
tion period, the NewJersey retirement systems had valuation assets of $53
billion and an actuarial accrued liability of $52 billion. They paid out $2.9
billion in benefits, and held excess valuation assets of $1 billion with a com-
bined funded ratio of 102 percent. As of1998, the combined NewJersey re-
tirement systems had over 418,000 active members and 166,000 retirees and
beneficiaries. Indeed, one out of every 14 residents of the state participates
in a public pension system.
The current healthy state of the NewJersey retirement systems is the result
of the state's long history of public retirement systems and also two public
policies, which shaped that history. The first was an early recognition of the
need to establish public retirement systems on a "scientific" (i.e., actuarial)
basis. The second policy was consolidation of retirement benefits for public
employees in state-administered retirement systems, an early development
and one extended to centralized asset investment and administration of the
systems during the 1950s. Because of national and state economic cycles, a
dramatic increase in public employment in the 1970s and 1980s, and benefit
enhancements provided in recent decades, funding of retirement benefits
in New Jersey has presented frequent budgetary challenges as well as op-
portunities for creative funding of public employee retirement benefits.
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Historical Developments in the New Jersey
State Retirement Systems
NewJersey has been in the retirement benefits business for a long time. Pen-
sions for various categories of police and fire personnel were authorized
under state law beginning in the 1880s (NewJersey State Legislature 1976).
A statewide contributory annuity plan for teachers financed by member con-
tributions was established by the Teacher's Retirement Fund Law in 1896
(L. 1896, c. 32). In 1906, pensions payable from public funds were autho-
rized for teachers with 40 years of service. But because no provision was
made for funding the liability for these pensions, the Teachers' Retirement
Fund experienced financial difficulties almost immediately and collapsed in
1919. In addition, there was a substantial unfunded liability relative to the
teachers' service pension law by that time. To address both problems, the
Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF) was established in 1919 and
continues today as the statewide retirement system for teachers in NewJer-
sey (L 1919, c. 80).
A significant aspect of the law which created TPAF was its recognition as
public policies that public funds should be used to fund public employee
pensions, and that public retirement systems should be "established on a
scientific basis" (actuarial basis) to "protect the future well-being" of their
members (L. 1919, c.80, Preamble, p. 157). These policies were also reflected
in a 1921 law which established a system similar to TPAF for state employers,
the State Employees' Retirement System (SERS). This system was made avail-
able to county and municipal employees at the option of local employers.
Uniform provisions for benefits and administration ofpolice and fire pen-
sion funds of counties and municipalities were provided under state law in
1920 (L. 1920, c. 160). These provisions were intended to provide financially
sound and efficiently administered pension plans for policemen and fire-
men, but the hope was not realized. In fact, in 1944, the local funds were
closed to new members and new employees were required to enroll in a new
state-administered plan, the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS;
L. 1944, c. 255). In 1952, some two hundred closed local police and fire
pension funds were consolidated into a state-administered fund, the Con-
solidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund (CPFPF), to provide for cen-
tralized administration of the benefits and funding on an actuarial reserve
basis. Provision was made for liquidation of the unfunded accrued liability
of the local funds with a substantial State contribution to the liquidation
(L. 1952, c. 266).
Investment of pension assets and administration of the retirement sys-
tems were initially the responsibility of the boards of trustees of the several
state retirement systems.The investment and administration responsibilities
were centralized in new state agencies, the Division of Investment and the
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Division of Pensions, respectively, in the 1950s (1950, c. 270; L. 1955, c. 70).
The two major state systems for public employees other than policemen and
firemen, TPAF and SERS, were integrated with social security in 1955. SERS
was terminated and the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) was
established with essentially the same membership and benefits, but it was
integrated with social security (L. 1954, c. 84). PERS is currently the retire-
ment system for state employees and local government employees not eli-
gible for other state or local retirement systems. TPAF was reorganized and
integrated with Social Security (L. 1955, c. 70). Under the integration, pen-
sion benefits under the two systems were reduced by the initial amount of
the social security benefits received by retirees.
In 1959, the Prison Officers Pension Fund, which was created in 1941 for
officers at the state prisons, was effectively closed to new members. New em-
ployees were required to join PERS (L. 1959, c. 170). Prison officers were
made eligible to participate in PFRS in 1973 (L. 1973, c. 156). In 1965, the
State Police Retirement System (SPRS) was established as the successor of
the State Police Retirement and Benevolent Fund, which was created in
1924. The purposes for the new system were to provide for actuarial reserve
funding of the system and systematic amortization of its unfunded accrued
liability (L. 1965, c. 89).
In 1969, an alternative retirement plan (to PERS and TPAF) , the alternate
benefit program (ABP), was provided for the faculty at the state colleges and
universities and the county colleges (L. 1969, c. 242). It constituted a signifi-
cant departure from the long-standing public policy for retirement benefits
for public employees, that is, defined benefit retirement systems adminis-
tered by the state, in that it was a defined contribution plan administered
by a third party (initially the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association
and the College Retirement Equity Fund, TIAA-CREF, but now includes six
additional vendors). In 1973, thejudicial retirement system (JRS) was estab-
lished for justices andjudges of the state and county courts. Numerous prior
laws which provided for pension and survivorship benefits for judges were
repealed (L. 1973, c. 140).
Today the process of consolidation of public retirement benefits in state
retirement systems is virtually complete. Only one municipal system and a
few special funds for lifeguards in a few beachfront cities are open to new
members.
A Period of Enhancements
The integration of PERS and TPAF with social security was the beginning of
a period of enhancement of retirement benefits for public employees that
continued for the next three and a half decades. Some of the more signifi-
cant enhancements are listed in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. Retirement Benefit Enhancements in New Jersey's Public Pension
System, 1958-92
1958 all systems-Ad hoc percentage increases in retirement allowances pro-
vided for persons who retired from state-administered retirement systems
through 1951 starting in 1959 (L. 1958, 143).
1965 CPFPF-Service retirement benefit formula changed from 1.67 percent
of final average compensation for each year of service to 2 percent a year of
service up to 25 years and 1 percent thereafter (L. 1964, c. 242).
• 1965 PFRS-Service retirement benefit formula changed from 1.67 percent of
final average compensation for each year of service to 2 percent a year of ser-
vice up to 25 years and 1 percent thereafter; ordinary disability pension (non-
service connected) increased from 25 percent to 40 percent of final average
compensation (L. 1964, c. 241).
• 1966 PERS-Relationship to social security changed from integration to co-
ordination of benefits (offset of PERS retirement benefits for initial social
security benefit eliminated, but employee contribution offset related to social
security retained); minimum ordinary disability benefit increased to 40 percent
from 28lj3 percent (L. 1966 c. 67); vesting period reduced from 20 to 15 years;
participation in PERS made mandatory for all public employees not required
to enroll in another contributory plan under state law (L. 1966, c. 217).
• 1966 TPAF -Relationship to social security changed from integration to co-
ordination of benefits (offset of TPAF retirement benefits for initial social
security benefit eliminated, but employee contribution offset related to social
security retained); minimum ordinary disability benefit increased to 40 percent
from 28lj3 percent; vesting period reduced from 20 to 15 years (L. 1966, c. 66
and c. 218).
1967 PFRS-Member contributions for group life insurance program elimi-
nated and pensions provided for dependent widows/widowers and children
(L. 1967, c. 250).
• 1969 all systems-Annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) provided for re-
tirees from state-administered retirement systems effective January 1, 1970
(L. 1969, c. 169 and c. 230).
• 1969 PFRS-Special early retirement benefit provided, under which a member
could retire at age 51 with 25 years of service on an unreduced benefit (L. 1969,
c. 90).
• 1971 PERS, TPAF, PFRS, CPFPF, and POPF-Major benefit liberalizations pro-
vided which included the following: reduction in period for final average salary
from five years to three years; change in the annual percentage reduction for
early retirement with 25 years of service before age 60 from 6 percent to 3 per-
cent; and, payment of noncontributory and contributory (if applicable) group
life insurance benefit in addition to an annual pension in cases of accidental
death (L. 1971, c. 121, c. 175, c. 179, c. 181 and c. 213).
1971 all systems-Annual cost-of-living adjustments extended to eligible sur-
vivors effeetiveJanuary 1,1972 (L. 1971, c. 139).
1972 state employees-State payment for retiree health benefits coverage
under the State Health Benefits Program for qualified retirees (25 years of ser-
vice or disability retirement) and their eligible dependents, but not survivors,
and reimbursement for Part B Medicare premiums (1972, c. 75).
• 1973 PERS and TPAF-Age for early retirement with unreduced benefit re-
duced from 60 to 55 (L. 1973, c. 129).
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TABLE 1. Continued
• 1973 PFRS and CPFPF - "25 and out" benefit provided under which a member
could retire on a benefit of 50 percent of average final compensation after 25
years of service regardless of age (L. 1973, c. 109 and c. 1l0).
• 1979 PFRS-Special retirement benefit increased from 50 percent to 60 per-
cent of average final compensation with 25 years of service (L. 1979, c. 109).
• 1981 CPFPF-Special retirement benefit increased from 50 percent to 60
percent of average final compensation with 25 years of service (L. 1981, c. 241).
• 1982 PFRS-Basis for special retirement benefit changed from average final
compensation (three years) to final compensation (final year) (L. 1982, c. 198).
• 1984 CPFPF - Basis for special retirement benefit changed from average final
compensation (three years) to final compensation (final year) (L. 1984, c. 127).
• 1985 PFRS-Widow/widowers pension increased from 25 percent to 35 percent
of average final compensation (L. 1985, c. 393.).
• 1987 TPAF-Postretirement medical benefits (PRM) for qualified retirees
(25 years of service or disability retirement) paid by the retirement system;
actuarial reserve funding on a phased-in basis provided for COLA and PRM
benefits (L. 1987, c. 385).
• 1987 CPFPF-Surviving widow or dependent widowers pension changed to sur-
viving spouse pension and percentage increased from 25 percent to 50 percent
of member's final average salary (L. 1987, c. 128).
• 1989 PFRS-Special retirement benefit increased from 60 percent to 65 per-
cent of average final compensation with 25 years of service; actuarial reserve
funding for COLA benefits provided; State to pay annual contributions to
the system in the amount of 1.8 percent of covered compensation to fund the
increase in the special retirement benefit granted in 1979 (L. 1989, c. 204).
• 1990 PERS-Actuarial reserve funding provided for COLA benefits on a
phased-in basis (L. 1990, c. 6.).
• 1991 PFRS-Widow/widowers pension increased from 35 percent to 50 per-
cent of average final compensation with the state to pay increased costs to the
retirement system for the benefit enhancement (L. 1991, c. 511).
• 1992 PERS and ABP-Payment by the State for PRM benefits provided for
qualified retirees of school boards (school district support staff, e.g., secre-
taries, custodians, cafeteria workers) and county colleges who are not members
ofTPAF (L. 1992, c. 126).
Source: Author's compilations.
The rising tide of benefit enhancements did not go unnoticed. With the
dramatic growth in the number of public employees from 1960 through the
1980s and the high inflation rates in the 1970s, the cost of public retirement
benefits began to present significant challenges to state budgets beginning
in the late 1970s. Only a few voices sounded the alarm in the wilderness of
budgets and benefits.
Storm Warnings of Problems Ahead
The first significant call for attention to public employee pensions and their
growth was a program analysis by a nonpartisan staff agency to the Legis-
332 Tom Bryan
lature. As part of its responsibility to "ascertain compliance with legislative
intent by the conduct of performance audits and efficiency studies," the
Office of Fiscal Affairs of the New Jersey Legislature was authorized by its
governing body, the Law Revision and Legislative Services Commission, to
undertake a program analysis of the contributory public employee pension
programs in the mid-1970s. The result was a comprehensive, three-volume
report that included expert pension policy and actuarial analysis by pension
and actuarial consultants. The second volume, entitled Program Analysis of
the Public Employees' Retirement System, highlighted the need for the study as
follows:
In terms ofgrowth in coverage and assets, and critical importance in providing for
the economic independence of an ever larger proportion of our population, public
employee pensions have achieved a role and significance unparalleled in years past.
(NewJersey State Legislature 1976: 1)
It documented this statement by highlighting the fact that membership in
the four active retirement systems grew by 134 percent from 1961 to 1973,
and assets increased by 313 percent over the same time period. The primary
purpose of the study was to provide the legislature with the data and ana-
lytic tools necessary to undertake policy development in the area of public
pension and retirement policy. Legislative involvement in such policy devel-
opment was necessary due to the "magnitude of the resources contributed
by the State, county and local governments in New Jersey to these pension
plans and the ever increasing burden of Social Security wage taxes" (New
Jersey State Legislature 1976: 7).
The primary recommendations of the study related to the funding of the
retirement systems and included the conclusion that the actuarial assump-
tions used to determine the liabilities and funding requirements for the re-
tirement systems, especially the salary increase and interest assumptions, be
closer to the actual experience of the systems to provide a more accurate
measure of the liabilities and current funding requirements. In addition, the
report examined the relationship of the two major systems, the Public Em-
ployees' Retirement System and the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, to
social security and recommended that the sizable and increasing state and
other employer contributions to social security be considered as part of the
overall costs ofpublic employee retirement benefits. It argued that measures
to control the overall costs be considered if the trend of increasing cost for
social security continued. The report recommended that changing the actu-
arial funding method from a projected benefit to an accrued benefit method
be considered to target the funding of the systems more closely to their on-
going liabilities and to potentially lower employer contributions. Finally, it
argued that pension adjustment benefits (cost-of-living adjustments in pen-
sion benefits or COLA) be funded on an actuarial reserve basis unless the
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annual rate of increase in the cost-of-living, the growth in the number of
covered employees, and the rate for the increase in the pension benefit (50
percent of the change in the consumer price index, CPI) remained at their
current levels. The report may have been too scholarly and "objective" for
the political environment to which it was addressed, and in any event it gen-
erated little or no action.
The next voice of concern, from State Treasurer Clifford A. Goldman,
sounded a clarion call for immediate attention to the potential budgetary
catastrophe from "explosive growth" in pension costs. In 1981 he posed the
problem starkly:
The independent actuary for PERS and TPAF hasjust completed a study of the costs
and benefit levels for the two major systems. The study confirms our fear that the
explosive growth in pension costs will continue and present the next administration
with some unavoidable questions about the future of our public retirement systems.
I believe that the preservation of these systems is going to require some fundamental
change in the benefit structures and that the earlier the need for change is recog-
nized, the less severe it will have to be. (NewJersey State Pension Study Commission
1984a)
Treasurer Goldman identified the critical factors driving up the costs as the
actuarial factors of life expectancy and salary levels, and the cost impact
of double-digit inflation on COLAs. An aggravating factor was continued
pay-as-you-go funding of the cost of living adjustment. Treasurer Goldman
recommended that the plan fund cost-of-living adjustments on an actuarial
reserve basis; establish a new noncontributory system for new employees
with a retirement benefit at age 65 of 1 percent of final compensation per
year of service; set a maximum percentage for the cost-of-living adjustment
of 4 percent; and, permit current employees to transfer to the new system,
trading in future larger benefits for a return of paid-in contributions and
ending their contribution requirement. It was too late in the Byrne admin-
istration for any action on the recommendations, but they clearly came to
the attention of the new administration of Governor Kean in 1982.
The increasing cost of public employee pensions and benefits was a major
focus of the Kean administration. In 1982, Governor Kean issued Executive
Order No.7, creating an ll-member pension review commission consisting
of: the state treasurer or his designee; a member of the State Investment
Council, two elected member's of the boards of trustees of the state retire-
ment systems, and three public members, all appointed by the governor;
and, two members of the Senate and General Assembly appointed by the
leaders of the respective houses on a bipartisan basis. The preamble clauses
to the order described the need for the study as follows:
Whereas, Substantial portions of the annual budgets of the State and its political
subdivisions consist ofappropriations to fund various retirement systems established
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by law for the benefit of public employees and their beneficiaries; and Whereas,
The State bears an especially large burden with respect to the funding of public em-
ployee pension liabilities, being responsible for employee pension contributions on
behalf of approximately 87,000 State workers, 137,000 schoolteachers, 300 judges
and many other active and retired public employees; and Whereas, The State Trea-
surer has estimated that for the fiscal year 1983 State contributions to the Teachers'
Pension and Annuity Fund and the Public Employees' Retirement System alone, ex-
clusive of payments to fund cost-of-living adjustments to retirees and beneficiaries
under those retirement systems, will increase from fiscal year 1982 by approximately
21 percent, with combined cost of $294 million; and Whereas, Forecasts for expen-
ditures suggest regular increases of the same magnitude; and Whereas, It is incum-
bent upon the State and local governments to maintain the integrity of their pension
funds. (Kean 1982: Preamble)
The Pension Study Commission provided its own statement of the problem
facing the State relative to retirement and health care costs for public em-
ployees:
The problem facing the State of New Jersey is that both retirement and health care
costs have escalated over the past 10-15 years more rapidly than any other State ex-
penditure. There are many reasons for this escalation, but if such trends continue,
both the State and its local governments will find it difficult, if not impossible, to
meet their employee benefit obligations without cutting other services.... the cost
of mandated retirement and health benefits to State employees has increased from
approximately 12.9 percent ofthe generalfund in 1976 to 18.2 percent in 1983. (New
Jersey State Pension Study Commission 1984b: 4)
The commission recommended several changes in the benefits under PERS
and TPAF. These included an increase in the age for unreduced benefits for
early retirement (with twenty-five years of service) from 55 to 60 or 62; an
increase in the normal retirement age (regardless of service) from 60 to 65
or 62; a reduction in the retirement benefit formula from 1.67 percent of
final average salary (three years) for each year of service to 0.75 percent of
final average salary for each year of service; the elimination of employee
contributions to the systems; a limit on the percentage of cost-of-living ad-
justments (60 percent of the CPI change) to 3 percent or 5 percent; the
establishment ofan incentive savings plan with employee contributions to a
maximum of 10 percent ofpay with matching employer contributions equal
to 50 percent ofemployee contributions to a maximum of1.5 percent ofpay;
the new plan would be mandatory for new employees and employees under
40 years of age with less than ten years of service; other employees would
have the option to transfer to the new plan; and, cost-of-living adjustments
would be funded on an actuarial reserve basis with the unfunded liability
for prior service funded over a forty-year period by level percentage of pay-
roll contributions. The Commission noted in its executive summary that its
solutions were consistent with the recommendations of Treasurer Goldman
to Governor Byrne (NewJersey State Pension Study Commission 1984c).
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A minority report was filed by three members of the commission, a sena-
tor, and assemblyman, and a trustee of the Teachers' Pension and Annuity
Fund, requesting that the governor not endorse the recommendations of
the majority of the commission. The minority report criticized the lack of
meetings of the whole commission and the fact that the work of the com-
mission seemed to be conducted by the staff director and the consultants
without much guidance, direction or input from the commission members.
It stated that
The impression of several commission members was that the commission was being
used to ratify and legitimize a series of predetermined conclusions of the current
administration regarding the need to save State monies at the expense of employee
and health benefits. (NewJersey State Pension Study Commission 1984d: 3)
It also contained a point-by-point rebuttal of a number of the recommen-
dation in the majority report. The minority members got their wish, as the
majority report was quickly abandoned.
Despite the failure of the Pension Study Commission Report to generate
any momentum for change relative to the state retirement systems, Gover-
nor Kean continued to highlight pension and benefits as mandated major
growth areas in the budget, a practice that was begun under the Byrne ad-
ministration. In his budget message for FY 1989, he addressed the problem
of pension and health benefits increases:
Still, I believe there are a number of areas where legally-required, formula driven
state spending is growing at an unsupportable rate. Even in an overheated economy,
some areas are growing much faster than revenues.... Spending on pensions and
employee health care has increased by 140 percent, three times the rate ofinflation,
since I took office. (Kean 1989: 5A)
His budget message for FY 1990 (the last year of his administration) drama-
tized the problem with more colorful language:
The problem is simple: we suffer from mandate-mania. Each year, legally mandated,
formula-driven, spending increases at rates far in excess of the rate of inflation. The
three problem areas are education funding, pension and employer-sponsored health
care and Medicaid. Each year these legally required programs devour an increas-
ingly large share of the budget. ... State spending on pension and health benefits
increased this year by more than $137 million and has grown by 183 percent since
1983. (Kean 1988: 23A)
The message also graphically illustrated the point over fiscal years 1984
through 1990. Other forces were at work that would bring the potential re-
tirement benefit funding crisis to a head.
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The Crisis Comes to a Head
The economic recession of the early 1990s precipitated severe budget crises
in the new administration of Governor Florio. For fiscal year 1990 income
and sales tax revenue increased by only 1.5 percent and 1.9 percent, respec-
tively, and the corporation tax revenue declined by 11.1. percent. The Florio
administration was faced with two major budget challenges in its first year
in office. The General Fund was awash in red ink and a new court mandate
requiring substantial additional state school aid was expected shortly. The
budget deficit was estimated to be over a billion dollars. The state budget
picture did not improve much in the second year of the Florio administra-
tion. Faced with a still bleak budget picture in 1992, Governor Florio pro-
posed a major budget initiative relative to retirement benefit funding. The
stated purpose for the initiative was to enable the State to provide more
property tax relief. Governor Florio described the initiative in his budget
message for fiscal year 1992-93:
I am proposing that we adopt a sound, conservative accounting practice, that will
allow us to continue more property tax relief. In this budget, we are taking the pru-
dent and long overdue step of revaluing State pensions by assessing them at mar-
ket rather than book value. Making this accounting adjustment is required by law
in the private sector. ... For years, the best accounting and auditing firms, as well
as the Kean administration and our Senate and Assembly leaders, have suggested
that the State adopt this sensible practice. In making this move, NewJersey isjoining
the majority of other States, which use this more accurate and equitable system. The
soundest accounting principles dictate we take this step. Let me say it in no uncer-
tain terms: every penny that has been paid into our State pension system is secure
and will remain that way. (Florio 1992: iii)
This budget initiative was commonly known as pension revaluation.
Pension Revaluation
As its name suggests, the primary innovation of pension revaluation was a
change in the valuation method for pension assets. Until that time, public
pension assets were valued at book value. During the 1980s, the Division
of Investment increased the percentage of pension assets invested in equi-
ties, and by 1991, there was a $5 billion difference between the book value
and market value of pension assets. Although the reasons for making the
valuation change were obvious, adoption of the proposal was not straight-
forward. A struggle developed in the legislature over how the pension as-
set windfall would be used. The state teachers' association, NJEA, and the
state employee unions wanted some of the money for improved funding for
COLA and PRM benefits. There was also an effort to enhance the autonomy
of the boards of trustees of the systems to give them greater control over
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the governance of the retirement systems. The two primary governance pro-
posals were to give the boards of trustees the right to choose the actuaries
and legal advisors to the retirement systems. The state treasurer had the au-
thority to choose the actuary and the attorney general was the legal advisor
to all the state retirement systems. This effort was spearheaded by the NJEA
and elected member representatives on the TPAF Board of Trustees.
A compromise was reached over use of the additional assets, under which
60 percent would be used to reduce employer contributions and 40 per-
cent would be used to improve funding for COLA and PRM benefits. The
liability for these benefits had been added to TPAF and PERS only a short
time previously (1987 for TPAF and 1988 for PERS). Annual COLA benefits
had been provided to retirees and beneficiaries beginning in 1969 on a pay-
as-you-go basis. The state had been paying the full cost of health benefits
coverage and Part B Medicare premiums for its qualified retirees (twenty-
five years of service or disability retirement) and their eligible dependents
since 1972. The NJEA and other teacher representatives had succeeded in
having legislation enacted in 1987 to provide for payment for health benefits
coverage byTPAF for qualified retirees under the system. The qualification
requirements were the same as for state employees. The rationale offered
for providing the benefit to teachers was that they were "state employees"
for retirement benefit purposes because the State paid the employer contri-
butions for their pension benefits under TPAF. Because the past service lia-
bility and annual normal costs for these benefits would have caused extraor-
dinary increases in employer contributions if they were funded in a more
traditional way, recognition of the liability was being phased slowly-over
thirty years for TPAF from 1987 and over twenty-five years for PERS from
1988. Both the normal contribution and the unfunded accrued liability con-
tributions were being phased in at the phase-in rate for recognition of the
liability. Once the liability was fully recognized, it would still take a substan-
tial additional period of time before the unfunded accrued liability would
be fully funded.
Under the compromise, 40 percent of the additional assets were used to
accelerate the phase-in percentages for recognition of the liability for COLA
and PRM. The additional assets fully funded the accrued liability for basic
benefits and for COLA for retirees and thus eliminated the unfunded ac-
crued liability for these items. This permitted acceleration of the phase-in
percentages and higher contributions for COLA and PRM.
The legislation which enacted pension revaluation also did several other
things (L. 1992, c. 41). It changed a number ofactuarial assumptions under
PERS and TPAF: increased regular interest (rate of return on investments)
from 7 percent to 8.75 percent; increased the average salary increase as-
sumption from 4.75 per cent and 5 percent to 6.25 percent; increased the
COLA inflation assumption from 2.25 percent and 2.5 percent to 3 percent;
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and, increased the medical inflation assumption (first ten years) from 10
percent to 12 percent. It reduced the percentage rate oftotal covered com-
pensation for state contributions to PFRS from 1.8 percent to 1.4 percent. It
required that local employer contributions for fiscal year 1992 be refunded
to the state. This latter provision was in lieu ofa reduction in state aid to mu-
nicipalities which would have been required without the savings. It provided
for actuarial reserve funding for COLA and PRM benefits under SPRS and
JRS and for use of the additional assets from revaluation for the funding in
those systems. The legislation also sought to allay fears of members of the
retirement systems that the changes might somehow affect their retirement
benefits by stating that "[n]o present or future retirees of the [listing of the
affected retirement systems] shall receive any reduction in benefits or incur
any additional costs" as a result of the revaluation provisions.
The governance effort led to the passage and presentation to the governor
of two bills, one with all the funding changes and some governance changes,
and the other with the same funding changes and additional governance en-
hancements for the boards of trustees. The governor conditionally vetoed
the first bill whereupon it was quickly amended to incorporate the gover-
nor's recommendations and passed, and signed on the last day offiscal 1992.
The governance changes in this bill included the following:
Gubernatorial appointments on the several pension boards were made
subject to advice and consent of the Senate.
Public pension boards were given the authority to select and employ
legal counsel for any matter for which the attorney general determined
that a conflict of interest would affect the ability of the attorney general
to represent the board.
An eleventh member was added to the State Investment Council who
would be appointed by the governor from a list of three persons nomi-
nated jointly by the senate president and the speaker of the General
Assembly.
The terms of current gubernatorial appointees to the pension boards
were terminated at the end of the sixth calendar month following the
effective date of the act.
The governor also conditionally vetoed this second bill, but it was
amended later in the year to incorporate the governor's recommendation
and was enacted (1992, c. 125). The final version of the bill made three addi-
tional governance changes:
It changed the authority to appoint pension actuaries from the state
treasurer to a Retirement Systems Actuary Selection Committee consist-
ing offour state officers, including the state treasurer, or their designees,
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and representatives of the three major pension boards, PERS, TPAF, and
PERS.
It preserved the authority to set the regular interest rate for the state
treasurer, but restricted this assumed rate to no more than 3 percent
higher than the average percentage of the salary increase assumption,
and the pension boards were prohibited from setting the average per-
centage of the salary increase assumption below 6 percent.
The Director of the Division of Pensions and Benefits was required to
communicate annually to the pension boards the relevant factors used
in calculating the state's contributions to the accrued liabilities of the
retirement systems, and the pension boards were to have access to all
the relevant actuarial information relating to any actuarial matter under
consideration by the boards.
On the same day that this bill was signed, another bill, which provided for
state payment for retiree health benefits coverage for qualified support staff
of school districts and county college employees not in TPAF, was signed.
The budget impact of pension revaluation was immediate and dramatic.
State contributions to the public retirement systems were reduced by $733
million in 1992 and $552 million for fiscal 1993; local employer contribu-
tions fell by $233 for fiscal year 1993. Table 2 provides a detailed list of the
savings for the two fiscal years.
Despite the savings from pension revaluation and improving economic
conditions, the state budget was again in trouble during Governor Florio's
fourth year. Legislation was enacted to remove the sharp increases in the
phase-in percentages for COLA and PRM benefits under TPAF and PERS
(L. 1993, c. 6 and c. 182).
One of the first budget initiatives of Governor Whitman's administration
involved a major pension funding revision, described in her first budget
message:
We are changing the way we fund pensions and health benefits for retirees in a way
that will save you more than $600 million this year and more than 3Y.! billion dollars
over the next four years without affecting benefits for a single retiree. We are not
taking a penny out of the pension system. We will continue to pay for health benefits
on an annual basis. (Whitman 1994: iii)
This budget initiative was commonly known as the Pension Reform pro-
posal.
Pension Reform
Six changes under pension reform were in the plan proposed initially by the
governor:
TABLE 2. Effects of Pension Revaluation in NewJersey
Contribution Contribution
Contributions Contributions rate before rate after
before reval. after reval. Difference % change reval. (%) reval. (%) Difference
1992 Employer contributions and rates
PERS-state $217,810,428 $105,450,960 ($112,359,468) (52) 10.1 4.9 (5.2)
PERS-local $254,602,473 $66,069,547 ($188,532,926) (74) 7.6 2.0 (5.6)
TPAF $619,156,837 $272,442,807 ($346,714,030) (56) 15.8 6.9 (8.9)
PFRS-state $48,408,556 $21,814,788 ($26,593,768) (55) 32.5 41.5 9.0
PFRS-local $187,604,239 $157,352,074 ($30,252,165 ) (16) 17.9 15.3 (2.6)
SPRS $26,192,429 $0 ($26,192,429) (100) 25.9 0.0 (25.9)
JRS $9,158,741 $7,191,769 ($1,966,972) (21) 29.4 23.5 (5.9)
CPFPF $6,283,451 $5,461,992 ($821,459) (13) N/A N/A N/A
Total $1,369,217,154 $635,783,937 ($733,433,217) (54)
1993 Employer contributions and rates
PERS-state $261,424,459 $136,225,509 ($125,198,950) (48) 11.5 5.9 (5.6)
PERS-local $296,615,200 $101,866,244 ($194,748,956) (66) 8.2 2.8 (5.4)
TPAF $726,271,036 $350,125,886 ($376,145,150) (52) 17.1 8.2 (8.9)
PFRS-state $57,325,482 $26,559,078 ($30,766,404) (54) 32.9 15.8 (17.1)
PFRS-local $217,630,772 $178,898,681 ($38,732,091) (18) 18.9 15.7 (3.2)
SPRS $18,034,210 $0 ($18,034,210) (100) 18.3 0.0 (18.3)
JRS $10,689,377 $9,518,759 ($1,170,618) (11) 29.6 26.4 (3.2)
CPFPF $6,634,211 $5,717,967 ($916,244) (14) N/A N/A N/A
Total $1,594,624,747 $808,912,124 ($785,712,623) (49)
Source: New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits (1992).
The New Jersey Pension System 341
Eliminate actuarial reserve funding for PRM benefits under TPAF and
for state employees under PERS, SPRS, and JRS. Fund the benefits on a
pay-as-you-go basis.
Change the funding method under the state retirement systems from
entry age normal to projected unit credit.
Increase the amortization period for funding the unfunded liabilities of
the systems from thirty to forty years.
Eliminate the 2 percent reduction on employee pension contributions
on compensation below the social security compensation limit.
Extend the phase-in of the impact of revised actuarial assumptions
under TPAF from two years to five years.
Decelerate the phase-in schedule for recognition and funding of COLA
benefits to the schedule prior to pension revaluation.
Rationales were provided for each of the proposed changes. Because of the
uncertainty over what the health care system in the country would be due to
the activity the federal level at the time, it was not prudent to contribute hun-
dreds ofmillions of taxpayer dollars to prefund PRM benefits.The change to
the projected unit credit method for funding the retirement systems would
more accurately reflect and fund the liability for retirement benefits on a
current basis as the benefits accrue each year. (The study by the Office of
Fiscal Affairs in 1976 suggested consideration of such a change in the fund-
ing method.) A forty-year amortization schedule for the unfunded accrued
liability was a common practice and was authorized under a proposed new
rule of the Government Accounting Standards Board. The elimination of
the 2 percent offset was long overdue and equitable because it continued
long after the basis for it, the offset in retirement benefits for initial social
security benefits, had been eliminated (in 1966).The extension ofthe phase-
in for the revised TPAF actuarial assumptions was justified because the pri-
mary revision related to improved mortality and the impact of the improved
mortality would not be experienced for several years. The deceleration of
the phase-in schedule for recognition and funding of COLA benefits was
justified because the acceleration under pension revaluation was an unwar-
ranted and costly alteration of the original schedule which was reasonable
for funding the benefit.
The proposal generated a bitter battle in the legislature. Led by the NJEA
and the state employee unions, the opposition lobbied hard to defeat
the proposal. Despite the opposition of these normally powerful interest
groups, the proposal passed with all the main elements of the initial pro-
posal included and with a few additional elements some of which enhanced
the savings under it.
As enacted by Chapter 62, Laws of 1994, pension reform made several
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key changes. It eliminated actuarial reserve funding for PRM benefits under
TPAF and PERS (state only), SPRS and JRS, and provided for pay-as-you-
go funding with additional annual state contributions to the PRM funds
under TPAF and PERS to provide a "cushion of reserves" designed to grow
at the rate of 0.5 percent of the covered payrolls of the systems. In addi-
tion, it changed the actuarial funding method from entry age normal to
the projected unit credit method, and reset the amortization period for the
unfunded accrued liability from thirty to forty years with required funding
progress for ten years until the schedule was reduced to thirty and a flexible
schedule which could not exceed thirty years thereafter to accommodate
gains and losses. Also, pension reform changed the employee contribution
rates under PERS and TPAF from variable rates based on entry age to a flat
5 percent and eliminated the 2 percent offset in the rates on compensation
subject to FICA, with a postponement of the change for one year for current
members and a transitional one-year flat rate of 4 percent for current mem-
bers who had effective contribution rates (full rate less the 2 percent offset)
ofless than 4 percent. It also extended the phase-in of the impact of revised
actuarial assumptions under TPAF from two to five years (the TPAF Board of
Trustees delayed revision ofthe assumptions for one year and phased-in the
impact over two years). It reverted to the percentage level recognition and
funding of COLA benefits under the schedule originally established under
the laws which provided for funding the benefit under the retirement sys-
tems, and extended the schedule to forty years from the beginning date of
the original schedule. In addition the law change reduced the CPI inflation
assumption for COLA benefits to 4 percent (the COLA increase assumption
is 60 percent of the CPI inflation assumption or 2.4 percent), and gave the
pension boards the right to review and change the CPI inflation assump-
tion if the CPI exceeded 4 percent for two consecutive years. In tandem,
it reduced the average salary increase assumption to 2.8 percent less than
the regular interest rate (8.75 percent) making it 5.95 percent for four years
with the pension boards having the right to review and change the rate to
a reasonable level if necessary thereafter. It also reduced from 1.4 percent
to 1.1 percent the percentage rate of total covered compensation for State
contributions to PFRS to fund the increase in the special retirement benefit
granted in 1979.
Table 3 shows the estimated savings for five years for each of the elements
of the final agreement on pension reform, and Table 4 illustrates the effect
of pension reform on employer contributions and contribution rates for fis-
cal years 1994 through 1996 for each New Jersey retirement system.
The opposition did not give up the fight, but instead moved to another
venue. The NJEA and the largest state employee union, CWA, instituted suit
in federal court to overturn the pension reform legislation.
Despite the continuing savings from pension reform, the state budget
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TABLE 3. Analysis of New Jersey Public Pension Reform: Savings ($ millions)
FY'94 FY'95 FY'96 FY'97 FY'98 Totals
(A) Change in pre-funding of PRM
State total 239.0 328.0 228.6 261.3 279.4 1,336.3
Local total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(B) Change to projected unit credit method and 40-year amortization
State total 58.5 151.8 226.1 278.3 318.3 1,033.0
Local total 80.0 108.8 122.1 148.2 168.6 627.7
(C) Delay assumption change in TPAF from 2 to 5 years
State total 0.0 60.0 56.0 40.0 23.0 179.0
(D) Revise member contribution to flat 5% rate
State total 0.0 0.0 30.0 65.0 70.0 165.0
Local total 0.0 0.0 9.0 20.0 22.0 51.0
(E) Return to original COLA phase-in schedule
State total 33.0 88.0 53.0 64.0 75.0 313.0
Local total 57.0 62.0 67.0 72.0 77.0 335.0
(F) Revise COLA assumption from 3% to 2.4% per year
State total 23.3 58.5 85.7 108.1 124.8 400.4
Local total 24.8 27.0 48.5 52.9 54.8 208.0
(G) Reduce average salary scale to 2.8% below regular interest
State total U.5 21.6 34.3 40.7 39.3 147.3
Local total 18.4 27.2 17.4 4.9 5.6 73.5
(H) Waiver of life insurance over $50,000
No savings estimated
(I) SHBP one-year withdrawal moratorium
No direct savings anticipated
State savings 365.3 707.9 713.7 857.4 929.8 3,574.0
State aid offset* 180.2 73.7 86.5 97.6 107.4 545.4
Total state savings 545.5 781.5 800.2 955.0 1,037.2 4,119.4
Local savings 180.2 225.0 264.0 298.0 328.0 1,295.2
State aid offset* 180.2 73.7 86.5 97.6 107.4 545.4
Total local savings 0.0 151.3 177.5 200.4 220.6 749.8
Source: NewJersey Division of Pensions and Benefits.
*Estimates 100% of local savings will accrue to the state in FY'94 and 32.75% beginning with
FY'95.
continued to face problems. Table 5 shows the actual amounts and annual
increases in the three major taxes and total revenues for fiscal years 1993
through 1998 and the estimated amounts for fiscal years 1999 and 2000. Be-
cause of pension revaluation and pension reform, it seemed unlikely that
there could be another pension funding initiative. However, history shows
that one should never underestimate the talents of creative budgeters.
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TABLE 4. New Jersey Pension Reform Anaysis: Contributions ($ millions)
Contributions Employer contribution rate
System FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996
PERS-state
Before reform $148.4 $198.5 $233.0 6.31% 7.96% 9.54%
After reform $57.8 $64.8 $91.7 1.26% 0.97% 1.48%
Difference ($90.6) ($133.7) ($141.3) -5.05% -6.99% -8.06%
TPAF
Before reform $380.5 $585.0 $725.0 8.32% 11.68% 13.99%
After reform $119.1 $61.2 $189.4 2.61% 0.96% 1.00%
Difference ($261.4) ($523.8) ($535.6) -5.71% -10.72% -12.99%
PERS-local
Before reform $138.6 $191.3 $225.0 3.58% 4.56% 5.28%
After reform $33.6 $29.5 $38.4 0.84% 0.60% 0.76%
Difference ($105.0) ($161.8) ($186.6) -2.74% -3.96% -4.52%
PFRS-state
Before reform $53.2 $111.5 $103.0 33.69% 52.80% 45.98%
After reform $36.4 $69.8 $78.7 19.53% 33.08% 34.93%
Difference ($16.8) ($41.7) ($24.3) -14.16% -19.72% -11.05%
SPRS
Before reform $10.8 $44.8 $47.5 10.70% 39.40% 40.56%
After reform $13.7 $27.9 $29.8 13.70% 24.50% 25.80%
Difference $2.9 ($16.9) ($17.7) 3.00% -14.90% -14.76%
JRS
Before reform $9.6 $12.3 $13.1 24.90% 29.90% 31.95%
After reform $9.1 $11.2 $15.5 23.40% 27.30% 38.40%
Difference ($0.5) ($1.1) $2.4 -1.50% -2.60% 6.45%
PFRS-local
Before reform $195.1 $195.6 $222.3 19.85% 15.10% 16.01%
After reform $119.1 $127.8 $178.1 9.65% 9.86% 12.95%
Difference ($76.0) ($67.8) ($44.2) -10.19% -5.23% -3.06%
1994 1995 1996
Total state savings $366.4 $717.2 $716.5
Total local savings $181.0 $229.6 $230.8
Source: Author's compilations from data supplied by the New Jersey Divison of Pensions and
Benefits.
Governor Whitman's budget message for fiscal year 1998 unveiled another
pension funding initiative:
I am also excited about our pension bond proposal. Here are the facts. Like three
dozen other states, our pension fund has an unfunded liability. With this proposal,
pensioners can rest easy knowing that their pensions are fully funded and that the
money will be there when they retire. We are saving today's taxpayers millions of dol-
lars by taking advantage of favorable market conditions and low interest rates to lock
into tomorrow's pension payments at today's prices. And we are protecting future
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TABLE 5. Annual Growth of Three Major Taxes and Total Revenues, FY 1993-2000
Sales tax % Income % Corporate % Total tax %
Year revenue change lax revenue change tax revenue change tax revenue change
1993 3,651,122 4,325,305 960,754 14,833,258
1994 3,725,645 2.04 4,493,660 3.89 1,091,142 13.57 14,967,778 0.91
1995 4,132,657 10.92 4,540,400 1.04 1,085,492 (0.52) 15,298,868 2.21
1996 4,318,373 4.49 4,733,786 4.26 1,171,509 7.92 15,873,379 3.76
1997 4,415,429 2.25 4,825,411 1.94 1,286,447 9.81 16,466,605 3.74
1998 4,766,195 7.94 5,590,579 15.86 1,231,629 (4.26) 17,444,555 5.94
1999* 5,015,000 5.22 6,065,000 8.49 1,478,000 20.00 17,961,746 2.96
2000* 5,258,000 4.85 6,477,000 6.79 1,555,600 5.25 18,859,136 5.00
Source: Whitman (1999).
*Estimated.
generations by refinancing this obligation over a shorter period of time. Clearly, this
proposal is good for us today and good for our grandchildren tomorrow. (Whitman
1997: ii)
This last pension initiative of the 1990s has become known as the pension
security proposal (PSP).
The Pension Security Reform
This proposal was rather more complicated than the two previous initiatives.
According to actuarial valuations, the state had an unfunded accrued lia-
bility under the retirement systems of$3.2 billion. There was also a projected
future unfunded liability from the phased-in recognition and funding of
COLA benefits with a present value of$1 billion. Under PERS and TPAF, the
basic benefits and retiree COLA were fully funded and had an asset surplus
of $543 million. The assets and liabilities for the COLA benefits for active
employees were tracked separately from basic benefits and retiree COLA
because of the phased-in recognition and funding of the active COLA. This
surplus was being amortized over the amortization period for the unfunded
accrued liability and was providing an annual credit against the employer
normal and unfunded accrued liability contributions. And finally, the last
piece of the puzzle was a surplus in the market value of pension assets (the
difference between the market value and the actuarial value of the assets)
of $1.9 billion.
Governor Whitman's original proposal was to issue pension obligation
bonds to fund the state's unfunded accrued liability to the state retirement
systems. These bonds would not be general obligation bonds, but rather
would be appropriation bonds which means that payment would depend on
the availability of legislative appropriations and there could be no guaran-
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TABLE 6. The NewJersey Pension Security Proposal ($ millions)
TPAFjPERS surplus assets (basic benefits)
Surplus market assets
Subtotal surplus assets
Pension obligation bonds
Subtotal pension obligation bonds and surplus assets
Unfunded accrued liability
Projected COLA unfunded liability
Subtotal accrued and projected unfunded liability
Pension obligation bonds and surplus assets
Interest discount on bond proceeds
Accrued and projected unfunded liability
1997 state pension contributions due
1997 state pension contributions paid
1998 state pension contributions due
1999 state pension contributions paid
1998 employee contribution reduction
Net surplus assets
FY'97 and FY'98 budget savings
Original
proposal
$543
1,919
2,462
3,213
5,675
3,213
1,042
4,256
5,675
357
4,256
334
82
415
67
o
670
$601
Plan
adopted
$543
1,919
2,462
2,750
5,212
3,213
1,042
4,256
5,212
305
4,256
334
82
415
67
47
3
$601
Source: Author's compilations from data supplied by the NewJersey Division of Pensions and
Benefits.
tee of such appropriations. The valuation assets of the retirement systems
would be reset to full market value for the actuarial valuations on which the
fiscal year 1998 pension contributions were based. The surplus assets from
resetting the pension assets to market value and the surplus assets for basic
benefits in PERS and TPAF would be used to fund the projected COLA un-
funded liability and the state pension contributions for fiscal years 1997 and
1998 to the extent of availability of surplus assets in the several funds. Table 6
shows the pertinent numbers for the original proposal and the plan actually
adopted.
The rationale for bonding the unfunded accrued liability was that due to
favorable conditions in the financial market, it could be funded at a lower
rate and over a substantially shorter time period than it could through the
retirement systems. Most of the unfunded liability was attributable to COLA
benefits under PERS and TPAF. Due to the phased-in recognition and fund-
ing of this liability under these systems, the liability would not be fully rec-
ognized until fiscal year 2029. The liability would not be fully funded until
fiscal year 2056. The total contribution to the retirement systems to fund the
liability over 59 years would have been $57 billion. The regular interest rate
(assumed rate of return on investment of pension assets) under the systems
was 8.75 percent. Under PSP, the liability could be funded over 32 years at
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TABLE 7. NewJersey State Retirement Systems: Five-Year Projection of Assets,
Liabilities, and Employer Contributions ($ Millions)
PERS PFRS
State TPAF State SPRS JRS CPFPF POPF
Fiscal year 2000
Market assets 8,860 28,703 1,350 1,345 358 56 20
Valuation assets 7,830 24,936 1,233 1,459 333 62 20
Actuarial liability 6,986 23,941 1,208 1,372 312 59 16
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (844) (995) (25) (86) (21) (3) (4)
Excess assets (559) (131) (25) (86) (21) (3) (4)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 97 339 91 32 13 0 0
Excess asset offset 97 144 30 32 13 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
PRM contribution 54 131 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 54 326 62 0 0 0 0
Net excess assets (656) 0 0 (55) (9) (3) (4)
Fiscal year 2001
Market assets 9,391 30,654 1,619 1,800 369 49 19
Valuation assets 8,496 27,374 1,419 1,535 348 54 19
Actuarial liability 7,474 25,741 1,351 1,481 333 52 15
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (1,022) (1,633) (68) (54) (15) (2) (4)
Excess assets (737) (781) (68) (54) (15) (2) (4)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 107 356 96 35 13 0 0
Excess asset offset 107 356 49 35 13 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 2 35 0 0 0
PRM contribution 58 144 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 58 144 48 0 0 0 0
Net excess assets (844) (425) (19) (19) (2) (2) (4)
Fiscal year 2002
Market assets 9,939 32,412 1,760 1,968 382 42 18
Valuation assets 9,160 29,558 1,587 1,630 364 47 18
Actuarial liability 8,010 27,553 1,510 1,608 356 46 14
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (1,150) (2,005) (77) (22) (8) (1) (4)
Excess assets (867) (1,173) (77) (22) (8) (1) (4)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 118 375 101 37 14 0 0
Excess asset offset 118 375 53 22 8 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
PRM contribution 62 159 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 62 159 49 15 6 0 0
Net excess assets (985) (798) (24) 0 0 (1) (4)
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TABLE 7. Continued
PERS PFRS
State TPAF State SPRS jRS CPFPF POPF
Fiscal year 2003
Market assets 10,501 34,225 1,914 2,151 396 36 17
Valuation assets 9,823 31,742 1,763 1,743 380 41 17
Actuarial liability 8,595 29,447 1,683 1,744 381 40 13
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (1,228) (2,295) (80) I I (1) (4)
Excess assets (945) (1,485) (80) 0 0 (1) (4)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 129 394 106 40 14 0 0
Excess asset offset 129 394 56 0 0 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 I 0 0 0 0
PRM contribution 66 175 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 66 175 50 40 14 0 0
Net excess assets (1,074) (1,091) (24) 0 0 (I) (4)
Source: Author's compilations ofdata for PERS, SPRS,jRS, CPFPF, and POPF supplied by Buck
Consultants, and for TPAF supplied by Milliman & Robertson.
Assumed asset investment return 8.75%; assumed market investment return FY2001 8.75%.
a lower interest rate at a cost of $10 billion. This would yield a saving of $47
billion in future pension contributions.
Opposition to this initiative was different from that expressed regarding
the pension reform plan. Now employee representatives were divided. The
state was proposing to payoff its unfunded liability to the state retirement
systems with bond proceeds. It would put several billion dollars into the
pensions funds and fully fund the state obligations under all the systems.
The NJEA recognized very early in the process the benefits to the retire-
ment systems from the proposal. It wanted some changes in the proposal,
such as a limit on the state's ability to continue to use excess assets to off-
set pension contributions and a benefit for the members of the retirement
systems. In exchange, state officials wanted the lawsuit over pension reform
to be settled. Concessions to the NJEA led that group to become an early
and strong supporter of the proposal. State employees unions were divided
on the proposals. They had weak relations with the Whitman administra-
tion, leading them to be reluctant to support the proposal. Eventually, the
proposal was supported by the national leadership of CWA, but some locals
opposed it; the AFL-CIO decided not to oppose it.
A few additional items were added to the proposal while it was under con-
sideration in the legislature. A limit was placed upon the ability of the state
to use the full amount of excess assets to offset normal contributions. It
could use the full amount through fiscal year 2003. It could use 84 percent
and 68 percent over the next two fiscal years, respectively, and 50 percent in
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TABLE 8. NewJersey State Retirement Systems: Five-Year Projection of Assets,
Liabilities, and Employer Contributions (in Millions)
PERS PFRS
State TPAF State SPRS IRS CPFPF POPF
Fiscal year 2000
Market assets 8,860 28,703 1,350 1,345 358 56 20
Valuation assets 7,830 24,936 1,233 1,459 333 62 20
Actuarial liability 6,986 23,941 1,208 1,372 312 59 16
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (844) (995) (25) (86) (21) (3) (4)
Excess assets (559) (131) (25) (86) (21) (3) (4)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 97 339 91 32 13 0 0
Excess asset offset 97 144 30 32 13 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
PRM contribution 54 131 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 54 326 62 0 0 0 0
Net excess assets (656) 0 0 (55) (9) (3) (4)
Fiscal year 2001
Market assets 8,626 28,180 1,619 1,656 339 45 17
Valuation assets 8,343 26,879 1,419 1,506 342 54 17
Actuarial liability 7,474 25,741 1,351 1,481 333 52 15
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (869) (1,138) (68) (25) (9) (1) (2)
Excess assets (584) (286) (68) (25) (9) (1) (2)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 107 356 96 35 13 0 0
Excess asset offset 107 318 49 25 9 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 2 35 0 0 0
PRM contribution 58 144 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 58 182 48 10 4 0 0
Net excess assets (691) 32 (19) 0 0 (1) (2)
Fiscal year 2002
Market assets 9,107 29,760 1,619 1,811 349 38 16
Valuation assets 8,860 28,627 1,558 1,576 352 45 16
Actuarial liability 8,010 27,553 1,510 1,608 356 46 14
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (850) (1,074) (48) 33 4 0 (2)
Excess assets (567) (241) (48) 0 0 0 (2)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 118 375 101 37 14 0 0
Excess asset offset 118 268 53 0 0 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
PRM contribution 62 159 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 62 266 49 38 14 0 0
Net excess assets (685) 0 0 0 0 0 (2)
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TABLE 8. Continued
PERS PFRS
State TPAF State SPRS JRS CPFPF POPF
Fiscal year 2003
Market assets 9,596 31,447 1,761 1,991 365 32 15
Valuation assets 9,381 30,462 1,708 1,675 367 38 15
Actuarial liability 8,595 29,447 1,683 1,744 381 40 13
Unfunded liability/
(Surpluss) (786) (1,015) (25) 69 14 2 (3)
Excess assets (503) (205) (25) 0 0 0 (3)
Employer contributions
Normal contributions 129 394 106 40 14 0 0
Excess asset offset 129 228 30 0 0 0 0
UL contribution 0 0 1 2 1 2 0
PRM contribution 66 175 0 0 0 0 0
Total contribution 66 341 77 42 15 2 0
Net excess assets (632) 0 0 0 0 0 (3)
Source: See Table 7.
Assumed asset investment return 8.75%; assumed market investment return FY2001 0.00%.
fiscal years thereafter. In order for there to be excess assets, the valuation as-
sets have to be sufficient to cover the full accrued actuarial liability and the
projected liability for COLA benefits under PERS and TPAF. Members of
PERS and TPAF were guaranteed a 0.5 percent reduction in their contribu-
tion rates (from 5 percent to 4.5 percent) from excess assets 1998 and 1999,
and continued contribution reductions of up to 0.5 percent if there were
excess assets and the state used them to offset normal contributions. The
state employee unions succeeded in obtaining a statutory guarantee against
a change in benefits once a member attained five years of service. This was
not a change in the vesting period which remained at 10 years and PRM
benefits were not included in the guarantee. Ultimately, PSP was passed by
a close vote in the Senate and a larger majority in the General Assembly;
the Governor signed it immediately in June of 1997, whereupon NJEA and
CWA dropped their law suit over pension reform.
Interest from investors was enormous. When the pension bonds were first
offered to the market, demand was eight times the value of bonds supplied.
Interest in the offering helped to reduce the interest rate, which came in
at average rate of 7.64 percent. This pension funding initiative like its two
predecessors had a dramatic positive impact on the state budget. Reduced
contribution amounts totaled $600 million for FY 1997 and 1998; over $200
million in contribution savings were budgeted for fiscal year 1999, and over
$400 million in FY 2000. There were also positive impacts on the public pen-
sion funds. One was due to the immediate addition of $2.75 billion to the
funds and the second was due to the enhanced investment return on not
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TABLE 9. Annual Invesunent Return on Pension Assets and CPI Change:
1985-1998.
Year ending
6/30/1985
6/30/1986
6/30/1987
6/30/1988
6/30/1989
6/30/1990
6/30/1991
6/30/1992
6/30/1993
6/30/1994
6/30/1995
6/30/1996
6/30/1997
6/30/1998
10-year average annual return
10-year average annual CPI change
14-year average annual return
14-year average annual CPI change
Average
annual
return
(%)
31.2
30.90
14.90
70.00
14.50
13.30
9.30
13.80
12.50
0.70
19.70
16.10
22.10
22.70
14.14%
3.25%
15.43%
3.25%
5-yr
average
annual
return
(%)
17.50
14.10
10.40
10.10
12.70
9.40
10.70
12.10
13.70
15.60
Consumer
price
index
(%)
3.70
1.70
3.70
3.90
5.30
4.30
4.70
3.00
3.00
2.50
3.00
2.80
2.30
1.70
5-yr
average
annual
increase
price
index
(%)
3.65
3.77
4.38
4.24
4.06
3.50
3.24
2.86
2.72
2.46
Source: Author's compilation of data supplied by the New Jersey Department of the Treasury,
and Whitman (2000).
only on the pension bond proceeds, but also the entire fund. For FY 1998,
the first full year after the addition of bond proceeds, the Division of Invest-
ment had an average rate of return on the pension assets of 22.7 percent.
Since the pension funds earned $624 million on the bond proceeds but debt
service was $91 million, net earnings totaled $533 million. They were $414
million more than the amount to cover the average interest rate (7.64 per-
cent) on the bonds, and $384 million more than the amount to cover the
interest assumption for the systems (8.75 percent). Partly as a result ofthis
plan, and double-digit investment returns on pension assets, fund balances
entering the new millennium are projected at $647 million.
Outlook for the Future
NewJersey pension funds are expected to do well in the next several years.
Estimates of pension assets, liabilities, and employer contribution require-
ments appear in Tables 7 and 8, under two scenarios. One assumes that the
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rate of return will be the regular interest assumption, 8.75 percent while
the second scenario assumes one flat year of zero return on investment, and
three years at the regular interest assumption. Under either scenario, the
State is projected to not have to make a normal contribution to PERS in each
of the four years. In TPAF, there would be a complete normal cost offset for
three of the four years with an 8.75 percent return, and substantial offsets
in each year even with one flat investment year.
The ability to undertake the funding initiatives of the 1990s is attribut-
able to the recent favorable investment climate. The State Investment Coun-
cil and Division of Investments has generated remarkable returns on pen-
sion asset investment, since it began to invest more of the pension assets in
equities. Table 9 shows the average annual pension returns and CPI changes
since 1984, and shows that the fund averaged returns of more than 14 per-
cent in the last decade and over 15 percent in the last five years (inflation
averaged 3.25 percent over the same periods). We conclude that the pub-
lic funds will continue to be in good shape even if there were an economic
slowdown in the near future. In fact, with current assets, the pension plans
could payout current annual benefits for over 20 years without another con-
tribution or another dollar in investment earnings.
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